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THE ILLINOIS GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS ACT-
A STEP AHEAD TOWARD BETTER GOVERNMENT
A serious problem which faces our system of government is the inade-
quate maintenance of moral and ethical standards in public affairs. De-
spite the many incidents of impropriety, dishonesty, and corrupt behavior
among our public officials, Congress has steadfastly refused to set any
meaningful standards prohibiting such conduct.' The time when Con-
gress has taken disciplinary action was when issues have been forced upon
them by the press or other outside pressures.2
1. Throughout the forties, fifties, and sixties numerous proposals have been
brought before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives concerning ethics
legislation. However, it was not until 1968 that both houses had created a perma-
nent committee on ethics and had a written ethics code. See KIRaY, CONGRESS
AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 211-232 (1970). See also 88 CONG. REC. 25275-78 (re-
marks of Senator Morse). This reluctance has been attributed to a "club spirit" or
institutional self-protectiveness which causes members of Congress either to ignore
misconduct or to close ranks in defense of an impugned member. WILSON, CON-
GRESS: CORRUPTION AND COMPROMISE 221, 222, 323 (1951). Professor Robert
Getz concluded that the delay of Congress in establishing an effective congressional
code of ethics resulted partly from the legislator's belief that "an objective settling
for the enforcement of such a code cannot be achieved within the halls of Congress."
See GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 100 (1966). James Kirby notes that congres-
sional inaction may be due to (1) "the belief that the electoral process should be
the exclusive discipline and that fundamental rights of people to choose represen-
tatives of their choice might be imperiled by regular congressional discipline of
members," (2) "the fear that repercussions from individual cases may produce
more harm than good in over-all effects upon public confidence in the Congress,"
(3) the belief in a "general need for harmony among members if it is to function
effectively," and (4) the belief that "[m]ost Members understandably regard it
(discipline) as a diversion from their main business." KInY, supra, at 213-215.
See also ROGOW and LASSWELL, POWER, CORRUPTION AND RECTITUDE 60-62 (1963).
2. In 1963, Representative Thomas F. Johnson (D-Md.) was convicted of
accepting compensation for using his office to assist Maryland savings-and-loan
institutions which were under federal indictment for mail fraud. See United
States v. Johnson, 215 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1965), afI'd. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). In
1963, a Senate investigation revealed that Senate Majority Secretary Bobby Baker
had heavily exploited his public office for private economic gains. See SENATE
COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS INTERESTS OF
OFFICERS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE SENATE, S. Rep. No. 1176, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1964). Senator Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.) was accused of using his Senatorial
powers to aid private clients and was censured by the Senate for misuse of political
funds. See 113 Cong. Rec. 15,695 (1967) and SENATE EThICS COMMITTEE, J. BOYD,
ABOVE THE LAW 271-74 (1968). In 1967, Representative Adam Clayton Powell was
censured, denied seniority, and fined $40,000 for various acts of misconduct. See
HOUSE SELECT COMM. PURSUANT TO H. RES. 1, IN RE ADAM CLAYTON POWELL,
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In the years following the Bobby Baker, Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, and Senator Thomas Dodd "scandals", 3 major steps have been
taken to eliminate financially induced dishonesty and impropriety in gov-
ernment. After the successful investigation of Senate Majority Secretary
Bobby Baker, which caused him to subsequently resign his position, the
Senate unanimously authorized the Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion to investigate financial interests of any Senate employee or former
employee.4  In 1964, the Rules Committee recommended passage of a
resolution requiring limited disclosure of assets and income by senators
and public employees.5  On October 21, 1965, the Ethics Committee-
designed to establish rules and standards of conduct in the field of sena-
torial responsibility-was officially organized. 6  Finally, on March 22,
1968, the Senate approved the Senate Ethics Code. 7
In the House of Representatives, ethical reform developed at a slower
pace. The House Rules Committee reported a resolution establishing a
Select Committee on Standards and Conduct late in the 88th Congress.
The resolution was amended to create a study committee charged with
"recommending" a code of ethics for the House and was passed in this
form.8 In 1968, the study committee proposed a code of ethical conduct,
disclosure rules, and also that it be made a permanent committee to police
H.R. Rep. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967). Also see generally, ANDERSON
AND %PEARSON, THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS (1968) and DOUGLAS, ETICS IN GoV-
ERNMENT (1952).
. It has been the feeling of many, that the force of public opinion via the press and
other outside pressures, which grew extensively out of the Baker, Powell, and Dodd
"scandals," had a great effect on Congress. Within four years of these "scandals"
both houses of Congress had enacted a code of ethics and a committee to enforce
them. See Senate Ethics Code Rules XLI-XLIV of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, adopted March 22, 1968. House Ethics Code. Rules XLIII-XLIV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, adopted March 22, 1968. House Ethics Code. Rules
XLIH-XLIV of the Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted April 3, 1968.
See also, Kirby, note'l, p. 220.
3. See supra note 2.
4. S. Res. 212, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 Cong. Rec. 19181-82 (1963).
5. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS
INTERESTS OF OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES OF THlE SENATE, S. Rep. No. 1175, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 107 (1964).
. 6. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON STANDARDS AND CONDUCT, STANDARD OF CONDUCT
FOR MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE SENATE,
S. Rep. No. 1015, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
7. Rules XLI-XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate (adopted, March 22,
1968).
8. 112 Cong. Rec. 27,729 (1966). For the complete debate on this matter
see 112 Cong. Rec. 27,713-30 (1966). This committee was re-established in the
90th Congress to continue its efforts on establishing a House ethics code. See
113 Cong. Rec. 9448 (1967).
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the code. On April 3, 1968, the House Ethics Code and Ethics Commit-
tee were adopted by the House of Representatives. 9
On the state level, in 1954, New York adopted the first governmental
ethics act. 10 The New York code set forth general standards of con-
duct to be used as guidelines for state officers and employees in the per-
formance of their public duties. Finding this to be an excellent method of
promoting proper ethical conduct, other states1 have adopted their own
ethics act. In 1958, a code of conduct was adopted for the guidance of
all in federal government service. 1 2  In the executive branch, officials
are subject to separate ethical rules contained in an executive order, 13
Civil Service regulations,' 4 and other such codes as prescribed in the in-
dividual department and agency. The effect of these acts and government
regulations along with various sections of state constitutions' " and statutes'"
have produced favorable results.
Although much has been accomplished in the area of overt corruption,
such as embezzlement, graft, and bribery little has been done in the more
9. Rules XI (19) and Rules XLIII-XLIV of the Rule of the House of Rep-
resentatives (adopted April 3, 1968).
10. Laws 1954, c.696 § I et seq., eff. Jan. 1, 1955.
11. A total of 24 states currently have some sort of ethics legislation-all of
which provide for a specific code of legislative conduct. See N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS
LAW § 73-80 (McKinney 1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 84-1-84-36 (1971); Pur-
don's PENN. STAT. ANN. 46 § 143.1-143.8 (1969); REV. CODE OF WASH. ANN.
§§ 42.21.010-42.21.090 (1969); CODE OF VA. §§ 2.1-347-2.1-358 (1972); W. VA.
CODE H8 6B-1-1-6B-1-3 (1972); N.M. STAT. §§ 5-12-1-5-12-15 (1971); REV.
STAT. OF NEB. § 49-1101-49-1117 (1971); Vernon's ANN. MO. STAT. §§ 105.450-
105.495 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN., §§ 75-4301-75-4316 (1971); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 127, § 601-101, et seq. (1971); Apiz. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1291--41-1297 (1972);
ARK. STAT. §§ 12-3001-12-3008 (1971); CONN. GOV'T STAT. ANN. §§ 1-16-1-78
(1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.311 et seq. (1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-925
(1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 68B.1-68B.10 (1971); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-1148
(1972); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. § 371-381 (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A,
§§ 1-24 (1968); MICH. .COM. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.301 et seq. (1972); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3.87-3.92 (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:13D-23 (1972).
12. H.R. Comm. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 312 (1958).
13. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. at 591 (1968).
14. CIVIL SERVICE COMM., EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILInES AND CONDUCT, 5 C.F.R.
§ 735 (1968).
15. For instance, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides several sections
which prohibit certain conduct. See Art. IV, sec. 6, Art. IV, sec. 2, Art. XLII,
sec. 1 and 2.
16. In 1965, the Illinois General Assembly passed a bribery statute making it
illegal for taking money or property while knowing the corrupt motive of the other
party. The statute also punishes the person conferring the benefit. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, sec. 33-1 (1969). Another existing control on legislative conduct is a
law which prohibits public officials from accepting or soliciting rewards for offi-
cial action. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, sec. 33-3 (1969).
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subtle but equally insidious and pervasive area of legislative conflicts of
interests.17 The term "conflict of interest" is generally limited to the situ-
ation where a public official's duties in office conflict with his own private
economic affairs.18  Although the term is definitively simple, it encom-
passes a wide range of legislative behavior-i.e. a "gray area" between
overt corruption on the one hand, and the reasonable maintenance of an
outside source of income, on the other hand.' 9 It is in this area where
the public official is most vulnerable and susceptible to acts of impro-
priety.
Today, "[m]embers of Congress consider and enact measures that in-
fluence all sectors of the nation's economy. Coupled with the legislator's
own financial interest,20 this makes it difficult (for him) to avoid possible
or actual conflict between . . . legislative duties and . . .private inter-
ests."2 1  Moreover, the ever-increasing role of government increases the
temptation for private interests to attempt to obtain influence with legisla-
tors through the giving of excessive gifts or hospitality or to influence
them by making available lucrative economic opportunities. 22 The need,
therefore, for appropriate legislation to deter legislative conflicts of
interest is compelling.
Recently, the legislature in Illinois enacted into law the Illinois Gov-
ernmental Ethics Act,2' with which the balance of this note will basically
be concerned. An analysis of the Act will be divided into three parts:
(1) a discussion of various conditions and factors leading to its enactment;
(2) a general outline of the Ethics Act and a discussion of it in relation to
17. The Senate and House Code of Ethics appears to have had little success in
this area. In support of the Senate Code, Ethics Committee Chairman Stennis
has referred to it as "not a finished product ...but a substantial beginning." See
114 Cong. Rec. E 9547 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1968) (remarks of Senator Stennis) and
114 Cong. Rec. S 2906 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1968). The same feeling is generated
from the House Ethics Committee. See H.R. Rep. No. 1176, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1968).
18. See R. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE,
5 (1966).
19. Id. p.3.
20. Today an ever increasing number of citizens assume public office while con-
tinuing to engage in private enterprises. This may or may not create a conflict of
interest. Such will depend upon the degree of involvement the public official puts
into these affairs. See Kaufman and Widas, California Conflict of Interest Laws,
36 So. CAL. L. REV. 186 (1969).
21. Supra note 18, at 5.
22. See Conflict of Interest Laws Commission, Ethical Standards in Ill. State
Gov't (Springfield: The Commission, 1967).
23. The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, as amended. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
127, §§ 601-101 et seq. (1971 Supp.).
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the problems it seeks to remedy; and (3) a discussion of the judicial in-
terpretations of the Illinois Ethics Act as compared with other various acts.
I.
The impetus of the Illinois General Assembly in adopting an act which
regulates and polices their conduct did not arise out of a vacuum. There
were several reasons-perhaps the most compelling of which was the ex-
istence of blatant corruption among the members of the General Assem-
bly. In 1964, Senator Paul Simon stated that in his opinion as many as
one-third of the legislators in the General Assembly had accepted "pay-
offs" for favors in the form of campaign contributions, legal or public rela-
tions fees. Others, he noted, accepted outright cash payments. He esti-
mated that about as many legislators received as much as $10,000 an-
nually and in some cases $100,000 "under-the-table. '24
In 1967, the Conflict of Interest Laws Commission reported that legisla-
tors were lobbying on behalf of private interests, they they, adverse to the
interest of the state, represented personal clients in matters pending before
the Court of Claims and Industrial Commission, and that conflicts of in-
terest existed in certain aspects of contracts between private concerns and
the state.2
5
It should be noted here that the Illinois judiciary has also been an ac-
tive arena for conflicts of interest. On June 17, 1969, the Illinois Supreme
Court appointed a special commission to investigate the integrity of the
judgment entered by the court in People v. Isaacs.26 The Commission
found that Judges Klingbiel and/or Solfisburg were guilty of acts of im-
propriety, creating a substantial doubt about their impartiality, integrity,
and fairness in the decision of the Isaacs case, and recommended that
they both resign. 27
Another fact compelling the adoption of ethical controls on Illinois leg-'
islators is that lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly is only on a
part-time basis.28 Because of this, the likelihood of conflict between pub-
lic duty and private economic interest is most pronounced. There are a
number of factors which contribute to this. First, the General Assembly
24. Paul Simon (as told by Alfred Balk), Ill. Legislature: Study in Corruption,
HARPER'S, September, 1964, at 74.
25. Conflict of Interest Laws Commission, Ethical Standards in Ill. State Gov't
(Springfield: The Commission, 1967), pp. 15-16, 19-30.
26. 37 Ill. 2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38 (1967).
27. IM. Sup. Ct. Report of the Special Comm. in re to No. 39797 (People of
the State of I11. v. Isaacs).
28. Even the Ethics Act takes note of this. See § 3-201.
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is in session for approximately six months, and, even during this period,
the legislator has a generous amount of time to devote to other interests.
The regular session of the General Assembly begins in January and ends
in June, during which time activity is usually limited to a Monday-
through-Thursday sequence, with Thursday often devoted to a perfunctory
session at which few members are present. 29  Through the years 1951 to
1969 the members of the House spent an average of 76 days out of 183 in
regular and perfunctory sessions. 30  During this same period the Senate
membership spent an average of 81 days in regular and perfunctory ses-
sions. 31 Although the trend shows an increase in the number of days the
General Assembly spends in session, "[c]ustom has dictated that legis-
lators need only devote a portion of their time to the lawmaking task."'3 2
A second factor contributing to the part time status of lawmaking is
that the salary is deemed insufficient to allow members to abandon their
private sources of icome. 3  Although legislators in only eight states3 4
receive higher salaries, the Illinois legislators have demonstrated no inter-
est in abandoning their private economic interests. A breakdown of the
76th General Assembly revealed that 58 members of the Senate and 177
members of the House continued with their present occupations.3 6
Thirdly, political life is too insecure.36 According to one authority:
There is no reason to expect the concern for legislative business to be either ex-
clusive or dominant in the affairs of any member. Political advancement to the
state judiciary, to the national Congress, or to full time administrative office only
29. See Frederic H. Guild, Behavioral Patterns for Handling the Legislative
Workload, Public Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois University, Carbon-
dale, Illinois, May 27, 1968.
30. See GOVE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 48
(1970).
31. Id. at 48.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 50.
34. California, New York, Michigan, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. See Citizens Conference on State Legislatures Research Memoran-
dum No. 12, June 1970.
35. Senate: (58 members) 20 lawyers, 11 insurance and/or real estate, 3 ac-
countants, 1 automobile dealer, 1 building contractor, 1 farmer, 1 health director,
1 heating oil director, 1 public supervisor, I public relations, 1 publisher, 1 res-
taurant owner, 1 retired, 1 school teacher, 1 superintendent of water collection.
House: (177 members) 50 lawyers, 31 insurance and/or real estate, 8 farmers, 8
city employees, 6 legislators, 6 contractors, 7 executives, 4 educators, 4 housewives,
3 restaurant owners, 3 merchants, 3 county employees, 2 public relations, 2 invest-
ments, 1 minister, 1 advertising, 1 journalist, 1 finance, 1 banker, and 31 other
occupations. See GovE, supra note 30, at 50.
36. Id. at 52.
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infrequently comes to members of the General Assembly. Consequently, a contin-
ued interest in private business or professional life is a necessity. 37
A more lofty consideration in the enactment of the Ethics Act, or at
least a beneficial by-product thereof, is the promotion of public confi-
dence. According to one authority, properly conceived financial disclo-
sure may serve three functions: first, to dispel public suspicion engen-
dered by past governmental impropriety and to instill in citizens trust and
confidence in government; second, to inform the public of facts revele-
vant to decisions made by government officials; and third, to provide a
means of deterring undesirable and improper conduct which may arise
from avoidable conflicts of interests. 38 By informing the public of those
economic interests and relationships which are likely to produce conflicts,
disclosure would encourage legislators to be more careful in their extra-
legislative economic activities. Furthermore, it would provide useful in-
formation to voters and help eliminate needless suspicion and rumors con-
cerning the integrity of innocent legislators and other government officials.
In order to insure, then, that private interests would not interfere with
the unbiased discharge of public responsibilities, the legislature enacted
into law the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act.39 The Act consists of five
parts: Article 1. Short Title and Definitions; Article 2. Restricted Legis-
lative Activities; Article 3. A Code of Conduct for legislators, persons with
legislative interests, and persons who are close economic associates of leg-
islators; Article 4A. Disclosure of Economic Interests; and Article 8.
Severability-which together form one of the most comprehensive acts in
ethics legislation to date.40 Although each section is instrumental in the
prevention and elimination of conflict of interest situations, the one most
effective in deterring these conflict situations is the section regarding the
disclosure of economic interests. 41
The financial disclosure provision as provided in the Illinois Ethics Act
is designed to deter and prevent possible conflicts of interest situations
that may arise throughout the entire government. Accordingly, the Act
requires economic disclosure by all members in the legislative, executive
37. STEINER AND GOvE, LEGISLATIVE POuTICS IN ILLINOIS, 3 (1960).
38. KIRBY, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 73 (1970).
39. See note 23.
40. At the end of 1969 only eleven states required the disclosure of economic
interests-i.e., California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington and West Virginia. See Cal. Ass.
Off. of Research and Comm. on Gov't Ethical Conduct and Gov't Integrity: The
Conflict of Interest Issue.
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101-604A-107 (Supp. 1972).
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and judiciary branches of government and by candidates for nomination
or election to these offices. 42 In addition, all government employees re-
ceiving $20,000 per year or more for their services, and all other persons
who serve on various governmental boards or commissions created by the
Illinois Constitution are required to file a statement of economic inter-
ests. 43  The Act further requires local government officials to disclose
their economic interests. 44
As stated earlier, the term "conflict of interest" encompasses a wide
range of behavior. Although some overt conflicts can be effectively pro-
hibited by the legislature, others may arise in so many different forms
and under such a variety of circumstances that it would be unwise and un-
just to proscribe them by an inflexible statute. 45  For matters of such
complexity and close distinctions, an ethics act must be broad enough in
scope to sufficiently cover this "gray" area, yet, at the same time, limited
so as not to be unconstitutionally defective-i.e., overbroad or vague.
The Illinois Ethics Act requires that a person subject to its provisions
must file a statement disclosing the interest of himself and possibly those
of his spouse and children if he "constructively controls" their economic
interest.4 6 The major interests which are to be included in the financial
statement are:
(1) The name, address, and type of practice of any professional organization or
individual professional practice in which the person making the statement was
an officer, director, associate, partner or proprietor, or served in any advisory
capacity, from which in excess of $1,200 was derived during the preceding
calendar year;
(2) The nature of professional services . . . and the nature of the entity to which
they were rendered if fees exceeding $5,000 were received . . . ;
(3) The identity . . . of any capital asset from which a capital gain of $5000 or
more was realized... ;
(4) The name of any entity from which a gift or gifts, or honorarium or honoraria,
valued singly or in the aggregate in excess of $500... ;
(5) The name and instrument of ownership in any entity doing business in the State
of Illinois, in which an ownership interest . . . is in excess of $5,000 fair market
value or from which dividends of in excess of $1,200 were derived. . . . No
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 123, § 604A-101(a), (b), and (e) (Supp. 1972).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-101(b), (c), (d), and (f) (Supp. 1972).
Also see ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-101(g), (h), and (i) (1971).
45. When adopting Art. XIII, § 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the dele-
gates to the Illinois Constitutional Convention were faced with the problem of
how flexible the financial disclosure should or should not be. See Con Con De-
bates, 1st reading, Proposition No. 13, No. p. 14-132, June 16, 1970.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (Supp. 1972).
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time or demand deposit in a financial institution, nor any debt instrument need
be listed;
(6) Except for professional service entities, the name of any entity and any posi-
tion held therein from which income of in excess of $1,200 were derived, ...
if the entity does business in the State of Illinois. No time or demand deposit
in a financial institution, nor any debt instrument need be listed (emphasis
added).47
The Act restricts diclosure to investments in entities doing business
"in" Illinois for state officials 48 and to those doing business "with" the
local government for local officials. 49 Furthermore, disclosure of economic
interests is limited to only those public officers and employees who are in
fact involved in policy-making functions. In all instances, the Act does
not require the public official or employee to disclose the actual amount of
income received from the business entities named therein.
The Illinois Ethics Act also covers those conflict of interest situations
that may arise in other ways. A state official is required to disclose any
possible conflict that may arise within the government itself. Accordingly,
he is required to name any unit of government which has employed him
during the preceding year other than the unit of government in relation
to which he was required to file.50
As stated previously, Senator Paul Simon found four areas of corruption
existing within the Illinois General Assembly-i.e., "payoffs" in the form
of (1) campaign receipts, (2) legal fees, (3) public relations fees, and
(4) outright "under-the-table" cash payments. The Conflict of Interest
Laws Commission found other areas where legislators have misused their
public offices-i.e., (1) lobbying on behalf of private entities, (2) repre-
senting private interests before public boards against the interests of the
state, and (3) using their public office to obtain favorable contracts for
themselves or private interests. In regard to these areas, the Act is most
effective in deterring legislative lobbying. The official is required to iden-
tify those persons who may have some influence over him in the exercise
of his public duty. He must, for instance, disclose the identity of those
compensated lobbyists with whom he maintains a close economic associa-
tion, including the name of the lobbyist, the nature of the lobbying activity,
and the type of economic activity of the client or principal on whose behalf
that person is lobbying.5' Also, under penalty of a fine not to exceed
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102(a)(l), (2), (3), (5), (b), (1), (2)
(Supp. 1972) (All emphasis added).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102(b)(1) (Supp. 1972).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102(c)(1) (Supp. 1972).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102(a)(4) (Supp. 1972).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1972).
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$5,000 and/or imprisonment, no legislator may engage in lobbying if he
accepts compensation "specifically attributable to such lobbying." '5 2
The Act is less effective in dealing with "payoffs," representation cases
and economic opportunities stemming from contracts. It provides that
"[n]o legislator may accept compensation . . . for performance of his
official legislative duties."5 3 The penalty for violation is a fine not to ex-
ceed $500. 5 4 The Act also prohibits legislators from accepting or partici-
pating in any way in any representation cases.55 The penalty for viola-
tion of this section is punishment by a fine not to exceed $5,000 and/or
imprisonment. 56 The Act further includes a section stating that no legis-
lator may accept any economic opportunity where he knows that such
opportunity has been made with the intent to influence him. 57
There is no deterrent effect of the Act upon campaign contributions.
It specifically excludes the disclosure of campaign receipts 5s which is a
type of economic interest most likely to produce a conflict of interest. 59
Also, political contributions were specifically removed from the ambit of
code of conduct.6°
After the statements of economic interests have been completed and
filed, 61 they are subject to public scrutiny. 62 If any statement is found to
be false or incomplete, the public official may be subject to a fine of
$1,000 or imprisonment in a penal institution.6 3  However, the Act does
not provide a penalty for those public officials who fail to file any state-
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 602-101 (1971).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 602-103 (1971).
54. Id.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 602-104 (1971). See also ILL. REV. STAT., ch.
127, § 603-105, 106 (1971).
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 602-104 (1971).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 603-102 (1971).
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (Supp. 1972).
59. In fact, the omission of campaign receipts was one of the grounds upon
which the trial court held the statute invalid. See Stein v. Howlett, 72 Ch. 345
(Ill. Cir. Ct. 1972). Although the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that
campaign receipts may have some influence upon the conduct of a public officer, it
held that such an omission did not make the act invalid.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 603-101 (1971).
61. State officials and employees must file with the Secretary of State. Local
officials and employees must file with the county clerk of the county in which the
person making the statement resides. See ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 127, § 604A-106
(Supp. 1972).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-106 (Supp. 1972).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1972).
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ment of economic interest. 64  Failure to file a statement shall result only
in ineligibility for or forfeiture of office.6 5 The Act only provides a sanc-
tion for those who "willfully" file a false or incomplete statement.66
Ill.
In order to preserve public confidence and respect in government, the
people must be provided with sufficient safeguards that will insure in-
tegrity, impartiality, and devotion on the part of their public officials.
The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act and the various other acts adopted
throughout the nation have been the first real attempt by the legislatures
to rid the government of corrupt politicians. However, despite this grave
need for more effective legislation in this area, the existing legislation has
been subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny. In 1970, for example,
the California Supreme Court in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young"7
struck down California's 1969 financial disclosure law68 as being too
broad and an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. On January 6, 1972,
the Attorney General of Texas declared the Texas Ethics Code enacted in
1971"o unconstitutional for similar reasons. 70 And most recently, in May,
1972, a case was brought before the Illinois Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act. 71
In Stein v. Howlett, the plaintiff brought a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the
expenditure of public funds for the purpose of enforcement of the Illinois
Governmental Ethics Act. It was his contention that the Act was too
broad and an unjust invasion of the right of privacy. Furthermore, he
claimed that the Act was not reasonably designed to disclose financial
dealings or assets which might be expected to give rise to conflicts of in-
terest. 72  The Circuit Court of Cook County found the Act unconstitu-
64. The Illinois Constitution merely provides that failure to file an economic
statement will result in ineligibility for, or forfeiture of, office. See ILL. CONST. art.
XIII, § 2.
65. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (1970).
66. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1972).
67. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
68. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3704 (West Supp. 1971). It is interesting to
note that on February 5, 1970, the California Attorney General, Thomas Lynch, held
the act constitutional. See Cal. Attorney General's Opinions No. 69-229, Feb. 5,
1970.
69. Tex. Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 962, pp. 2906-12.
70. The Att'y Gen. of Texas, Op. M-1039, Jan. 6, 1972. However, the act is
still constitutional.
71. Stein v. Howlett, 72 Ch. 345 (I11. Cir. Ct. 1972).
72. Id. at 1.
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tional and granted an injunction restraining the use of funds in adminis-
tering its provisions. The supreme court, however, did not agree and
found the Illinois Ethics Act constitutional except insofar as it purported
to authorize the Secretary of State to render advisory opinions. 73
In arriving at the above conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Ethics Act was designed to protect the decision-making
process. More specifically, "[t]he Ethics Act was designed to avoid any
conflict of interest between the government and its officers and employees;
one purpose of the Act was to disclose any abuse of office and to instill
in the public, trust and confidence in its government and officials."' 74 Un-
like the California Supreme Court's decision in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea
v. Young where the California disclosure statute was declared unconstitu-
tional because of its broad restrictions, the Illinois Supreme Court found
that the purpose of the legislation supported the necessity for broad stat-
utory coverage. The court further stated that the "statute reflects a com-
pelling governmental interest which is paramount to the right of the indi-
vidual, and the statute is not overbroad and an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy."'7 5
In answering the plaintiff's allegation that the Act was not reasonably
designed to disclose financial dealings or assets which might be expected
to give rise to conflicts of interests, the court said:
[We acknowledge that the disclosure of a business connection which is truly unre-
lated to any State activity cannot help to achieve the desired purpose. But who is
to say whether or not there is a business connection or relation with the State?
Who is to say that the business within the State which does not do business directly
with the State, but which supplies another company which does, has no connection
with the State? Who is to say that a capital gain from the sale of an asset to a
stockbroker of a company doing business with the State has no connection with
the position of the public official? . . . It would be an anomaly to enact a statute,
designed to eliminate conflicts of interest between public trust and private gain, in
such manner that the person affected is permitted to decide when a financial interest
relates to his public employment. 7 6
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-106 (Supp. 1972). The record shows that
for the purpose of taking a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the At-
torney General elected to stand on the plaintiff's pleading, waived any evidentiary
hearing, and requested the entry of a permanent injunction. Stein v. Howlett, 72
Ch. 345 (Il. Cir. Ct. 1972).
74. Stein v. Howlett, 72 Ch. 345 (111. Cir. Ct. 1972).
75. Id. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1956).
76. Stein v. Howlett, 72 Ch. 345, 348 (Il1. Cir. Ct. 1972).
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In order for the statute to have any effect in curbing possible conflicts of
interest, it must .be broad enough in scope to sufficiently cover the area.
When the Illinois Supreme Court ruled the Illinois Governmental Eth-
ics Act constitutional, it was aware that its decision was contrary to the
decision reached in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young.. Although the
same constitutional questions were raised, the Illinois Supreme Court
found the California case to be distinguishable in many ways: first, in
California, many public agencies were faced with impending resignations
of numerous officers and employees who were not willing to make public
disclosure of private financial affairs. 77 Also, the plaintiff city alleged
that many of its officials would resign rather than be subjected to what
"they" contended was an unconstitutional invasion of their privacy.
Plaintiff also alleged that "resignation of the . . . officers will- have -a
crippling effect upon the affairs of municipal government. . .. ,,78 In Illi-
nois no such threats were ever made.
Second, the Illinois Constitution provides a mandate from the people,
giving the power to the legislature to enact a strong governmental ethics
act.79  The California Constitution, on the other hand, does not. Third,
the Illinois Ethics Act limits public disclosure to economic interests owned
by the public official and .possibly those ,of his wife and children if he
"constructively controls" their economic interests. 0 The California stat-
ute requires that the public official must disclose the economic interest of
himself, his or her spouse, and minor children whether. he. controls:, their
interest or not. And fourth, the California statute makes no distinction
between state and local public officials as to the degree 'of disclosure."'
Under the Illinois Ethics Act, there is a distinction. State officials are re-
quired to list ownership interest in any entitY doing business "in" the State
of Illinois.82  Local officials arerequired to list such interests only if the
business entity does business "with" 'the local unit of government with
which the person is'connected.83
In summation, Governor Thomas E. Dewey once said that:
[Those who exercise public and political power are trustees of the hopes and aspira-
tions .of all mankind. They are the trustees of a system of government in which
77. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P..2d 225, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970).
78. 2 Cal. 3d at 263, 466 P.2d at 227, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
79. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (Supp. 1972).
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3601, 3605, 3702, 3753 (West Supp. 1971).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102(b)(l) and (2) (Supp. 1972).
83.' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 6'04A-102(c)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1972).
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the people must be able to place their absolute trust; for the preservation of their
welfare, their safety and all they hold dear depends upon it.84
Those who exercise public and political power have the obligation to act
with unwavering integrity, absolute impartiality, and complete devotion
to the public interest. Where there exists the possibility of a conflict be-
tween public responsibility and private interests, the people are entitled
to know. As stated earlier, the likelihood of conflict between public duty
and private economic interest in the Illinois government is most pro-
nounced. In order to insure that private interests would not interfere with
the unbiased discharge of public responsibilities, the legislature enacted
into the law the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act. It is one of the most
significant advancements in the field of ethics legislation to date.
Barry L. Chaet
84. Hon. Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of N.Y., in his Jan. 6, 1954 message to
the N.Y. legislature.
1972]

